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1 Introduction "No one is satised with the U.S. corporate tax system. Some argue (...) But others say, the main problem is that the United States has a higher corporate tax rate than any other major country and, unlike other countries, imposes severe taxes on income earned outside its borders. This, they argue, unfairly burdens companies engaged in international competition and discourages the repatriation of prots earned abroad." (Lawrence Summers in the Washington Post July 7th, 2013). This paper analyzes a particular aspect in which tax systems may distort the international competition between rms: The eect of repatriation taxes on international mergers and acquisitions. When prots from foreign subsidiaries are repatriated by a United States (U.S.) corporate parent, the U.S. taxes the dividend at the domestic corporation tax rate of 35 % (plus state taxes), while crediting the foreign taxes already paid on the repatriated prots (foreign dividend tax credit system). In contrast, all other major developed countries generally exempt dividends received by the parent from foreign subsidiaries from taxation (dividend exemption system).
Repatriation taxes to be paid on a target's prots following international mergers and acquisitions reduce the discounted future cash ows to the investor, which results in a lower valuation of the target. Ceteris paribus, due to repatriation taxes, the bid price of U.S. investors is relatively lower than that of an identical investor from an exemption country. Investors from the U.S. should thus less frequently succeed in acquiring targets.
Put dierently, the U.S. corporate tax system may "unfairly burden companies engaged in international competition" for corporate control. In this paper, we empirically investigate if a foreign tax credit system indeed impedes foreign acquisitions and we quantify the implied loss in eciency. This is a particularly relevant issue given the important role that cross-border mergers and acquisitions play for foreign direct investment (FDI) especially between developed economies. In 2011, their value increased by 53 % to $ 526 billion and the implied loss in eciency due to distortions in the market for corporate control may therefore be correspondingly huge.
In 2009, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Japan switched from a tax credit system to an exemption system. This is the rst time that two major capital exporting economies fundamentally changed their international taxation regimes an event, which allows us to directly identify the regimes' eect on international mergers and acquisitions. In contrast, previous empirical identication strategies had to rely on indirect changes in double taxation due to variations of withholding taxes or corporate tax rates in either the capital exporting or capital importing country. With such an indirect approach, it is possible that the observed eect of double taxation is actually an artifact which should instead be attributed to the underlying changes themselves for example, the fact that a tax treaty has been concluded or that the corporate income tax rate has changed.
We consider a large sample of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the period from 2004 to 2010. For every target rm, we analyze the origin of the eventual acquirer by estimating conditional logit models, nested logit models, and simulated maximum likelihood models. The treatment group in the sample is represented by the acquirer countries, which switch from a foreign tax credit regime to an exemption regime, while the strength of the treatment is moderated by the tax rate dierentials between acquirer and target countries.
We nd that repatriation taxes reduce the competitiveness of investors from tax credit countries in the international market for corporate control. The size of this eect is conditional on the acquirer's tax rate relative to the the rest of the world: the larger the home country's corporate income tax rate, the larger the repatriation taxes due.
Accordingly, the eect of the reform is more pronounced for Japan than for the U.K.
because the Japanese tax rate of 40.69 % is higher in 2009 than the British tax rate of 28 %. We estimate the abolishment of the tax credit system in Japan to have increased the number of international mergers and acquisitions with a Japanese acquirer by 31.9 %. The estimated eect for the U.K. is only 3.9 %. We nally simulate a switch in the U.S. from a credit to an exemption regime, which implies an increase in the number of international mergers and acquisitions with U.S. acquirers by 17.1 %.
The empirical results are relevant for the ongoing discussion on the U.S. corporate tax system as well as for the scientic discussion on the design of international tax systems.
The seminal paper by Musgrave (1969) argues that a foreign tax credit system is optimal from a global perspective because it establishes production eciency by means of capital export neutrality. On the other hand, Desai and Hines (2003) and Becker and Fuest (2010) develop the counterargument that ownership neutrality may be more relevant for eciency in a world in which FDI takes place mainly by means of mergers & acquisitions and not by means of greeneld investment. In this case, repatriation taxes distort production eciency as they distort ownership structures in favor of parent rms, which are not subject to these kind of taxes. Ownership advantages (e.g. expected synergies) are therefore not optimally exploited.
Based on these arguments, Grith, Hines and Sørensen (2010) recommend the abolishment of foreign tax credits in the U.K. in favor of exempting dividends to improve the competitiveness of U.K.-based multinational companies in the international market for corporate control. The controversial discussion of the two systems of double taxation relief with respect to neutrality properties would be rather moot if the two systems -as they are actually put in practice -resulted in identical empirical patterns. However, our results conrm that ownership structures are indeed distorted by asymmetries in international taxation, as a policy switch from credit to exemption does increase the amount of acquisitions abroad. With respect to distortions of ownership neutrality, we estimate the yearly gain in eciency in the form of additional synergies raised to be in the order of 525 million dollar for the Japanese tax reform and 13.5 million dollar for the tax reform in the U.K. A simulation of a policy change to an exemption system in the U.S. implies gains of 1,134 million dollar.
Several papers deal with the empirical eects of international taxation on FDI in general (see e.g. Slemrod (1990) , Swenson (1994) , Hines (1996) , Gropp and Kostial (2000) , Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) and Hajkova et al. (2006) ). However, the empirical literature on the eect of international taxation on mergers and acquisitions is scarce. Di Giovanni (2005), Herger et al. (2011) and Arulampalam et al. (2012) consider the eect of host country corporate taxation. Huizinga and Voget (2009) additionally include withholding taxes in their analysis, while Barrios et al. (2012) consider the establishment of new foreign subsidiaries. In contrast to the previous literature, we directly identify the eect of a systematic change in international taxation. Furthermore, instead of analyzing the choice of location for investment, we focus on the location of the investor, as our ultimate interest is in the loss of eciency due to violations of ownership neutrality.
In the following, section 2 describes the tax treatment of foreign source dividends within multinational rms, and it presents the empirical framework for estimating the eect of this international tax on the location of the investor in M&A deals. Section 3 describes the M&A data and the control variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
International Taxation and the Valuation of Firms
In line with the recommendations of the OECD model tax treaty, cross-border dividend repatriations from foreign subsidiaries to their corporate parent within the OECD are generally governed by one of two methods of double taxation relief: either the dividends are exempted from further taxation at the level of the corporate parent (exemption system) or the repatriated dividends are subject to the corporate income tax in the parent's country while receiving a tax credit for taxes already paid abroad (foreign tax credit system). This additional tax burden on repatriated dividends may put acquirers from countries with a foreign credit system at a disadvantage when bidding for foreign corporations, specically in low tax locations because the additional tax is inversely related to the target rm's corporate income tax. The unique feature in our period of observation is the policy switch of two major capital exporting countries -Japan and the U.K. -from a foreign tax credit system to an exemption system in 2009.
3 Accordingly, the empirical analysis is particularly designed to isolate the eect of this policy change from other developments in the tax system. Furthermore, even country-specic reactions to the nancial crisis should not aect our estimation results, as the proposed identication strategy relies on changes at the bilateral level.
Empirical Model
Following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Becker and Fuest (2010) , let us assume that takeovers reect the synergies from combining two rms and that all assets are priced at fair value. Let
be the value of rm k in country j if it was owned by an investor from country i. 4 The term T ij captures the cost of additional taxation to be paid when dividends are repatriated from country j to country i. The variable vector x ijk and the error term ijk represent other observable and unobservable factors, which capture the general size of rm k's prots as well as ownership-specic synergies which are realized by combining rm k with a particular investor. 5 Country-specic and time-specic eects are accounted for by means of dummy variables. The error term ijk follows an extreme value distribution as seen in McFadden (1974) , and the coecients α and β are parameters to be estimated. A given target rm will be acquired by an investor from country i if the corresponding reservation price is higher than for any other acquirer,
the probability of which is given by
3 New Zealand also switched to an exemption system in 2009. In the interest of brevity, we will focus our discussion on the cases of Japan and the U.K. 4 A subscript t indicating the time-period is suppressed. 5 Arulampalam et al. (2012) give an example, in which labeling goods with a well-known brand allows the rm to raise prices resulting in larger prots. In Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Palepu (1986) , more ecient management increases the target rm's value. 6 The probability is conditional on the takeover being protable for at least one acquirer. We expect this condition to be independent of P (V ijk ≥ V hjk ).
where I indicates the number of potential acquirer countries. 7 The parameters α and β can then be estimated by a conditional logit regression in a sample of M&A deals. A negative value for α would be in line with the conjecture of Desai and Hines (2003) , that rms subject to repatriation taxes are at a disadvantage when bidding for foreign rms. While the conditional logit model is conceptually straightforward, estimates may be biased if the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption is violated. Alternatively, mixed logit regressions and nested logit regressions are therefore applied as specied in robustness checks of the empirical analysis.
Identication Strategy
The rst, most parsimonious approach analyzes the policy change as a treatment eect:
Countries with a foreign tax credit system apply the treatment (i.e. additional taxes)
to dividends from sources with a lower tax level, in which case the treatment dummy variable takes the value one. 8 The treatment is abolished by starting to exempt foreignsource dividends from taxation. Unobserved factors are controlled for by country-xed eects and time-xed eects. 9 Specically, the variable of interest is constructed as 
where τ j is the corporate income tax rate in the subsidiary's country j and τ i the tax rate in the parent's country i. However, the parsimony of this approach comes at the cost of precision because the treatment is assumed to be homogenous. In a second step, the heterogeneity of the treatment is therefore taken into account by using the tax dierential between host and home country as a measure for the dose of the treatment -the size of repatriation taxes: 
7 For the current research question, it is sucient to analyze the matching of target rms with acquiring countries instead of the matching of target rms with particular acquiring rms for which it would be challenging to construct an appropriate choice set. Variations in the number of potential acquiring rms across countries are subsumed in country-specic eects, which are accounted for in all regressions. 8 Foreign tax credits are always limited such that the tax on the repatriated dividends cannot become negative when corporate income taxes are higher in the subsidiary's country than in the parent's country. 9 Time-xed eects simply cancel out in this estimation framework as they apply equally to all potential acquirers of a target rm.
If this repatriation tax handicaps the acquisition of foreign rms, one should nd a negative eect when estimating its coecient in expression (3). Some countries do not fully exempt foreign-source dividends. A certain percentage of the dividends may be deemed to be non-deductible expenses and be added to the parent's taxable income, leading to a repatriation tax burden. Moving further away from the treatment eect design, the measure of repatriation taxes can therefore be rened in a third step by also taking into account that some countries such as Germany or France do not fully exempt foreign-source dividends. Instead, usually 5 % of foreign-source dividends remain subject to corporate income taxes, such that the variable of interest is dened as
if τ i > τ j and country i applies foreign tax credit system
(1 − τ j )xτ i , if country i exempts only a share of (1-x ) 0, otherwise.
The above measure accounts only for the tax on dividends imposed by the parent country.
The subsidiary's country, however, may impose additional withholding taxes on dividends.
Though withholding taxes are creditable foreign taxes, these additional taxes may cause an excess credit situation and the overall double tax on dividend repatriations may increase.
If the subsidiary's country levies withholding taxes on dividends, the compound double tax is calculated as:
if country i applies foreign tax credit system
only a share of (1-x )
where ω ij is the applicable withholding tax rate for dividend payments from a subsidiary in country j to its parent in country i. Foreign corporation tax is dicult to avoid even if dividends are eventually repatriated via third countries (e.g. by interposing a foreign conduit company). Dividend routing, however, matters in case of withholding taxes. These taxes may be reduced signicantly or even avoided if received by the parent via interposed foreign companies. In line with this, Barrios et al. (2012) nd that the establishment of new foreign subsidiaries does not appear to be aected by withholding taxes, which could be attributed to the use of conduit companies. 11 This potential dierence in eect conditional on the source of repatriation taxes is further investigated in robustness checks of the empirical analysis. Australia applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Chile, Estonia, Greece, Island, Israel, Luxembourg, Portugal and Turkey. Canada applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Greece and Turkey. Spain applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in New Zealand and Finland applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Chile. 2010: Canada applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Greece and Turkey. Finland applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Chile.
Other features of international taxation cannot be explicitly accounted for because it would require speculative assumptions not only about the actual acquirer but also about its contenders with respect to their international structure and the timing of repatriations. For example, the repatriation tax may be deferred until the foreign prots are distributed reducing the eective repatriation tax burden. This is implicitly taken into account as it attenuates the estimated coecient of the statutory double tax measure.
Similarly, acquirers may nd the potential double tax less relevant if they are in a position of having excess foreign tax credits due to a pre-existing large share of business in hightax countries. Again, this would be reected in attenuated coecient estimates of the statutory double tax measure. Table 1 summarizes the prevalent method of double tax relief for the potential acquirer locations at the beginning and at the end of our sample period. The U.S. is currently the only country left, which still applies a foreign tax credit system, apart from Ireland, where the method of double tax relief is practically irrelevant due to the low Irish corporate income tax rate of 12.5 %. In Japan the foreign tax credit system was replaced Variable denitions and data sources are listed in Table 6 in the Appendix. Ernst & Young (2011 ), p. 1179 , Carr et al. (2009 and Gutiérrez at al.
(2011). 14 See Ernst & Young (2011), p. 789 -790 and Gutiérrez at al. (2011), p. 759. 15 Deals without a uniquely determined acquirer or target are excluded. work. At the level of the acquirer country, the corporate income tax rate, τ i , controls for shocks to the parent rm's investment, which serves as a common input in a multinational production process. For example, Becker and Riedel (2012) nd a negative eect of parent country tax rates on foreign aliate investment. The gross domestic product per capita, GDP C i , and the gross domestic product growth rate, GDP G i , may have a positive eect, reecting dierences in productivity across potential acquirers. Good nancing conditions as proxied by a country's stock market capitalization relative to GDP, Stock i , should increase the likelihood of a successful bid. Furthermore, a strong exchange rate, Exch i , may facilitate foreign acquisitions (Blonigen (1997) ). The variables GDP S ki and Deals ki capture the specialisation of acquirer countries in particular industries. GDP S ki measures the share of the target's industry sector in the GDP of the acquiring country one year prior to the M&A, whereas Deals ki counts how many cross-border deals in the target rm's industry originated from the acquirer country over the preceding 5 years.
Several variables such as distance, Dist ij , and indicators for common borders, N eighb ij , common languages, Lang ij , former colonial relationships Colony ij , and formerly having been part of the same nation, Same ij , control for bilateral variation in transaction costs which increase with the cultural and geographic distance between countries. These control variables were also found to be relevant for cross-border M&As by Di Giovanni (2005) . Table 2 presents the results of multinomial choice regressions explaining the acquirer's country of origin in the previously described sample of M&As. For every M&A deal, the dependent variable equals one for the actual acquirer's country of origin and zero for the counterfactual acquirer locations. In the conditional logit regression (1), the variable of interest is the parsimonious treatment dummy T dummy ij dened in expression (4), which indicates an additional tax on dividend repatriations due to insucient foreign tax credits.
Empirical Results
The negative coecient implies that the switch to an exemption system by Japan and the U.K. facilitates successful bids for target rms in countries with relatively lower tax rates.
A heterogenous treatment eect is allowed for in regression (2), as the variable of interest T ∆ ij , dened in expression (5), measures the size of potential repatriation taxes on dividends. Again, the coecient is found to be negative, although its p-value is now substantially smaller than in regression (1). The higher signicance is most probably due to removing the assumption of homogenous repatriation taxes.
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 502) , the economic eect implied by regression (2) is estimated by the change in predicted probabilities, as the variable of interest is perturbed while keeping all other variables constant. In particular, we simulate the counterfactual that the U.K. had not exempted foreign-source dividends from taxation in 2009 and 2010. Table 3 lists the average predicted probabilities of harboring the successful acquirer in a cross-border M&A deal based on the actual variables in column (1), and based on the simulated variables in column (2). The comparison implies that the switch to an exemption system has increased British acquisitions abroad by 3.9 % (= (0.1581 − 0.1522)/0.1522) or by 1.8 billion U.S. dollar in terms of yearly volume. Along the same lines, we simulate that Japan had not introduced an exemption system in 2009. The corresponding predicted probabilities for the actual and the counterfactual situation in columns (1) and (3) imply that Japanese acquisitions abroad have increased by 31.9 % or by 4.1 billion U.S. dollar in terms of yearly volume. The more pronounced eect is due to the Japanese corporate income tax rate of 40.7 % being considerably higher than the British corporate income tax rate of 28 %. Hence, the abolished potential double taxation of Japanese dividend repatriations was larger and occured in more cases than for British repatriations. In fact, the Japanese tax rate is the maximum tax rate through the whole sample period. Inspired by the discussion in the U.S. for a reform of foreign (1) and (2) are conditional logit regressions, while regressions (3) to (6) are mixed logit regressions. All regressions control for acquirer country specic eects, which follow a random distribution in the mixed logit regressions. The parameter estimates for the acquirer country-specic estimates in the mixed logit regressions are shown in Table 8 . Regressions (4) to (6) are identical to regression (3) except for standard errors, which are robust to clustering on the target-country/year level, target-country/industry level and the industry/year level, respectively. p-values in parentheses, * denotes signicance at the 10%-level, * * at the 5%-level and * * * at the 1%-level respectively.
corporate income taxation, we also simulate that the U.S. had exempted foreign-source dividends in 2009 and 2010, the average predicted probabilities of which are listed in column (4). Such a policy change is calculated to increase the number of U.S. acquisitions abroad by 17.1 % or by 15.9 billion U.S. dollar in terms of yearly volume. Among the control variables, the likelihood of a successful bid is negatively related to the acquirer's corporate income tax rate, τ i , as shocks to investment in common input factors at the parent level appear to decrease the value of acquisitions abroad. The positive signs of gross domestic product per capita, GDP C i , and of the gross domestic product growth rate, GDP G i , suggest that highly productive rms are more likely to engage in FDI as argued by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) . The positive eect of stock market capitalization over GDP, Stock i , reects the comparative advantage of acquirers with access to well developed capital markets. The exchange rate does not show a signicant eect. Specialization in the target's industry as measured by the relevant industry sector share in the acquiring country's GDP, GDP S ki , and the acquiring country's number of cross-border acquisitions in the relevant industry over the preceding 5 years, Deals ki also appears to explain the prevailing acquirer location. The signicant eects of distance, Dist ij , common borders, N eighb ij , common languages, Lang ij , former colonial relationships, Colony ij , and formerly having been part of the same nation, Same ij , suggest the presence of bilateral transaction costs, for example, in the form of cultural frictions or information costs.
The conditional logit regressions may be inconsistent if the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is violated. We test the IIA assumption by a series of 20
Hausman tests, in which one country at a time is excluded from the choice set. In half of the cases, the estimates based on the reduced samples dier signicantly from the full sample estimates, which casts doubt upon the validity of the IIA assumption. On the other hand, Cheng and Long (2006) argue that tests of the IIA assumption based on restricted choice sets perform very poorly even in large samples. Nevertheless, the IIA assumption appears to be rather strong from a theoretical perspective, for example, if acquirer countries' industrial specialisations cannot be suciently controlled for by observables: a manufacturing rm, may be more likely to be acquired by a German rm, whereas a target nancial rm may be more likely to be acquired from the U.K. or from the U.S. One set of acquirer-country xed eects for the whole sample would therefore be too restrictive, as the eects should vary across industries. Similarly, regional markets may integrate at dierent speeds than the global market and a target may be more likely (or less likely) to be acquired from a country within the same regional market than from overseas. In both cases the IIA assumption is violated. Allowing for a larger number of xed eects acquirer-country by industry, acquirer-country by target-country or even a combination of the two by means of dummy variables is not a viable approach as the large number of parameters would result in an incidental parameter bias (Greene (2012), p. 659-661).
Instead, a mixed logit estimator (Train (2009) , p. 138) is applied in regression (3) of Table 2 , in which the vector of coecients for the country-specic eects γ is allowed to be random according to a normal distribution with mean g and covariance W . Parameters are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton draws. The estimated standard deviations of the normal distribution are highly signicant indicating that this approach should be preferred to the conditional logit regression. Therefore, we stick to mixed logit regressions for most of the remaining analysis. Eventually, this choice is immaterial because the basic implications remain similar: the coecient of the variable of interest, T ax ∆ ij remains signicantly negative in regression (3). As previously conducted, we simulate counterfactual policies in the U.K., Japan, and the U.S for taxing foreignsource dividends in the period 2009-2010. The change in average predicted probabilities suggests that exempting dividends has increased or, in the case of the U.S., would have increased the number of acquisitions abroad by 3.7 % for the U.K., by 30.4 % for Japan, and 16.2 % for the U.S. Regressions (4) through (6) are similar to regression (3), but standard errors are now robust to clustering at the level of the target-country/year pairs (regression (4)), at the level of target-country/industry pairs (regression (5)) and at the level of industry/year pairs (regression (6)). The level of signicance is hardly sensitive to the choice of clustering. The same result is found when errors are simply clustered by industry.
As mentioned before, the unique feature in our data is the policy switch of two major capital exporting countries -Japan and the U.K. -from a foreign tax credit system to an exemption system. However, tax rates varied between 2004 and 2010, which also aects our repatriation tax measure T ∆ ij . In regression (1) of Table 4 Protable target rms may indeed be bought for the future prots they promise while loss-making rms may be bought for strategic reasons such as removing the threat of a potential future competitor or acquiring a common input factor. The former group of acquisitions could be more aected by taxes on dividend repatriations than the latter group. This hypothesis is tested in regression (3) of Table 4 by allowing the coecient of T ∆ ij to dier between the two groups. Indeed, repatriation taxes appear to have a stronger eect in case of protable target rms than in case of loss-making target rms. The dierence in the coecients is signicant at a p-value of 0.0543.
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Regression (4) of Table 4 controls for further heterogeneity in target rms by allowing the propensity to be acquired by a particular country to vary conditional on targetspecic controls (total assets and protability). The coecient for repatriation taxes remains signicant and increases in size. Table 9 lists the coecients of the target-specic variables per acquirer location except for the U.S., which serves as the country of reference.
Interestingly, the coecients for target protability are signicantly positive for quite a number of acquirer locations, but never signicantly negative. This pattern implies that the probability of a U.S. acquirer decreases in the target rm's protability, which may reect that highly protable rms are relatively less valuable to U.S. acquirers due to repatriation taxes in line with the ndings of the previous robustness check, where the acquisition of protable targets was more aected by repatriation taxes than the acquisition of loss-making rms.
17 Correspondingly, a one-sided test for a more negative coecient in case of protable rms would have a p-value of 0.0271. The gure shows the kernel distribution of simulated coecients of T ∆ ij in specication (5) of Table 4 using the method described by Train (2009, p.256) with 50 Halton draws. The mean of the simulated coecients is -3.99, the standard deviation is 1.28. The bandwidth for the kernel density is 0.13.
Instead of modeling the source of heterogeneity explicitly, regression (5) of Table 4 accounts for dierent sensitivity to double taxation by also allowing the coecient of T ∆ ij to be randomly distributed. With a value of -3.99, the average coecient is more negative than in the previous regressions. Specic values of the coecients per target rm can be simulated as in Train (2009, p.256) . Figure 2 displays a Kernel density estimate of these simulated coecients. In line with the previous robustness checks investigating the relationship between double taxation and target protability, there is a signicant dierence in target protability when the sample is split at the median of the simulated coecients of T ∆ ij . Observations with more negative coecients have an average protsto-assets ratio of 4.1 % whereas observations with less negative coecients have an average prots-to-assets ratio of 2.8 %.
18 18 Extreme outliers of prot-to-assets ratios below -1 or above 1 were disregarded. Otherwise the sample Regression (6) of Table 4 departs from the treatment eect design by using the repatriation tax measure T ∆2 ij dened by expression (6) on p. 6, which also accounts for repatriation taxes due to incomplete exemption of dividends as some countries exempt only 95 or 97 % of repatriated dividends from taxation. The estimated coecients are very similar to previous results.
The measure T ∆2 ij in expression (6) accounts only for the tax on dividends imposed by the parent country. This tax is dicult to avoid even if dividends are eventually repatriated via third countries. The overall double tax on dividend repatriations T ∆3 ij dened by expression (7) can be larger if the subsidiary's country imposes withholding taxes, which a multinational may or may not be able to circumvent by means of conduit companies.
In regression (7) of Table 4 , the coecient for T ∆3 ij is considerably attenuated compared to previous estimates and it is no longer signicant, which suggests that withholding taxes may have a dierent eect than taxes imposed by the parent rm's country. This hypothesis is explicitly investigated in regression (8) of Table 4 by including
as a separate variable, which captures the potential additional tax burden due to withholding taxes, while T ∆2 ij controls for taxes imposed by the parent rm's country. The two coecients are found to be signicantly dierent with a p-value of less than 0.01.
The negative coecient of T ∆2 ij is similar to previous estimates while the insignicant coecient of W ithholding ij with a point estimate close to zero suggests that withholding taxes can be avoided at low cost. This result is similar to the nding of Barrios et al. (2012) that the establishment of new foreign subsidiaries does not appear to be aected by withholding taxes.
The nested logit regression (9) in Table 4 is an alternative to the mixed logit approach, which is also robust to violations of the IIA assumption. As a generalization of the conditional logit regression, it allows for a two-level choice process: at the rst level a preferred subset of choices is determined, while the specic choice is picked at the second level from within the subset. 19 However, some structure has to be imposed ex-ante by dening the relevant subsets of choices. In the current setting, a geographic grouping of potential acquirer countries appears most sensible. In particular, we distinguish between acquirers from Asia/Australasia, from Europe, and from North-America. As before, T ∆ ij has a signifcantly negative eect.
The results above show that taxes on dividend repatriations distort cross-border ownership patterns. As the additional tax burden diers between acquirer locations, one variance would increase from 0.045 to 334 and the kurtosis would increase from 7.9 to 4553. 19 See, for example, Greene (2012) , p.808-810, for more details. The gure shows the kernel density estimate of premiums paid by Japanese acquirers for foreign listed companies. The premium is dened as hundred times the dierence between the acquisition price and the price one day prior to the announcement of the acquisition, divided by the latter. 24.2% of the M&As have a premium smaller than 12.8. The bandwidth for the kernel density is 22.0.
In order to calculate the decrease in synergies due to second-best ownership, we cuto the left tail of the distribution of take-over premia oered by Japanase acquirers, as displayed in Figure 3 , such that the proportion of the left tail relative to the whole distribution is equal to the increase in the total number of M&As due to switching from a credit to an exemption system (as calculated on p. 10). At the cut-o, the premium is 12.8 percentage points. This value is the upper bound for the loss in synergies caused by inecient ownership due to double taxation. This upper bound is reached, for example, under the (polar) assumption that for all the acquisitions by Japanese rms, the secondbest bidder is never willing to pay more for a target rm than the going market price.
Hence, if all Japanese acquirers decreased their premiums oered by 12.8 percentage points, then 24.2 % of the acquisitions would no longer have a Japanese acquirer. The synergies reected in the take-over premiums of these acquisitions would no longer be realized.
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The loss in synergies would be correspondingly smaller than this upper bound if there exist second-best bids close to the rst best bids of the Japanese acquirers -because then a smaller reduction in the premiums oered by Japanese acquirers would already cause the same proportion of M&As to be lost.
The increase in M&As with Japanese acquirers due to switching to an exemption system (estimated on p. 10) represents an average yearly deal volume of 4,100 million U.S. dollar.
Hence, the yearly eciency loss due to inecient ownership caused by Japanese double taxation may have been up to 525 million U.S. dollar (=12.8% × 4,100 million U.S. dollar).
Similar calculations show the value of synergies raised to be in the order of 13.5 million dollar per year for the case of the British international tax reform. Simulating such a reform for the U.S. results in a yearly value of 1,134 million dollar of additional synergies.
Conclusion
The empirical analysis nds that multinationals from countries which impose taxes on repatriated prots do indeed face a comparative disavantage in acquiring foreign rms.
Japan and the U.K. both started to exempt foreign-source dividends from tax in 2009.
These reforms are found to have increased the number of foreign acquisitions by Japanese rms by 31.9 %, whereas the number of foreign acquisitions by British rms increased by 3.9 %. The identication approach relies directly on policy changes in double tax relief and not on changes in tax rates, so we can exclude that the observed eects are just an artifact of a change in the underlying corporate income tax. The implied loss in eciency due to violations of ownership neutrality is sizeable: in the case of double taxation of multinationals based in the U.S., the loss in eciency of 1,134 million dollar per year is in the order of 1.2 % of the yearly total value of U.S. acquisitions abroad. In that sense, one could draw the conclusion that the U.S. as the only remaining major country still relying on a foreign tax credit system should follow the British and Japanese example of exempting foreign source dividends in order to create a level playing eld for competing acquirers and thereby avoid second-best ownership structures.
However, our results should not be interpreted as suggesting that exempting dividends from tax is a panacea for all ineciencies which may arise in the international investment process. First, as Becker and Fuest (2010) argue, even for M&As the exemption system is not optimal from a national perspective if foreign acquisitions rely on rival input factors 20 Andrade et al. (2001) show that synergies are almost fully reected in take-over premia.
from the headquarters, for example, management capacity. Foreign activities would then crowd out domestic forms of engagement. Second, the aspect of capital export neutrality raised by Musgrave (1969) still applies to the classic mode of FDI, in which capital is exported. Eventually, the optimal balance between ownership neutrality and capital export neutrality should depend on the relative share of greeneld investment versus M&As in FDI. The alternative option of discriminating the two modes of FDI for tax purposes may not be feasible in practice. Sources: Chennells and Grith (1997) , Eurostat (2004), and KPMG (2003) .
Appendix
IBFD (2010a). Previous issues of these publications were consulted as well.
τ j
Corporate income tax of the target-country including average state and municipal taxes, measured in percentage-points (0.01 = one %).
Used to compute T dummy ij , T ∆ ij and T ∆2 ij .
Sources: like τ i ω ij
Withholding tax rate applicable for dividends distributed from country j to a parent located in country i.
Sources: Coopers & Lybrand (1998 ) and IBFD (2010a , 2010b . Previous issues of these publications were consulted as well.
GDP C i
Per capita gross domestic product in thousand dollars in the year before the announcement date in the candidate-country converted to international dollar using purchasing power parity rates.
Source: Worldbank (2010) .
GDP G i
Growth rate of gross domestic product of the candidate-country in the year of the announcement date, measured in percentage-points.
Sources: Worldbank (2010) and OECD (2010),Aggregate National Accounts:
Gross domestic product, OECD National Accounts Statistics (database) for 2010 data. GDP S ki Fraction of the target industry sector (rst, second or third) in the gross domestic product of the candidate country in the year before the announcement date.
Source: Worldbank (2010) , target sector taken from SIC-codes provided by Zephyr.
to be continued on next page 
Dist ij
Logarithm of the simple distance between the most populated cities of the candidate-and target-country in km.
Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005) .
N eighb ij Dummy variable, 1 for contiguity of candidate-and target-country.
Lang ij
Dummy variable, 1 for common ocial primary language in the candidate-and target-country.
Colony ij Dummy variable, 1 if candidate-and target-country pairs were ever in colonial relationship.
Same ij
Dummy variable, 1 if candidate-and target-country were or are the same country.
Asset k
Logarithm of pre-deal target total assets in thousand U.S. Dollar in the last available year before the acquisition announcement.
Source: Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk.
P rof k
Pre-deal target prot after tax in thousand U.S. Dollar in the last available year before the announcement divided by pre-deal target total assets in thousand U.S. Dollar in the last available year before the acquisition announcement.
Source: Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk. For detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Table 6 . (4) in Table 4 . The rst part of the table lists the coecients (and corresponding p-values) of the target-specic variables Asset k and P rof k interacted with potential acquirer locations. The second part of the table reports the means and standard deviations of the random coecients of the potential acquirer country dummy variables and their corresponding p-values. In all cases, the U.S. represents the base category.
